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A Constitutional Challenge to Michigan's Ban on Second Parent Adoptions
b ,the Unmarried Partner fthe Child's Current Parent
By: Robert A. Sedler, JD.
Robert A. Sedler is
Distinguished Professor of
Law and Gibbs Chair in
Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties at Wayne State
University.
Itappears that the Michigan
law providing for second parent
adoptions 1 has been interpreted by
most judges in the state as being lim-
ited to an adoption by a prospec-
tive adoptive parent who is married
to the child's current parent.' As so
interpreted, the statute would pro-
hibit a second parent adoption by
the current parent's heterosexual
partner where the couple has cho-
sen not to marry and by the current
parent's same sex partner, since
same sex persons cannot marry
under Michigan law.' Inthis article,
I will discuss a possible constitu-
tional challenge to this ban, and I
will do so from the perspective of a
lawyer putting together such a chal-
lenge.
I have previously discussed at
length constitutional challenges to
laws and governmental action from
the perspective of the lawyer liti-
gating such challenges.' The per-
spective of the litigating lawyer in-
volves framing particular kinds of
constitutional challenges in light of
existing constitutional doctrine and
its capacity for extension. Consti-
tutional cases do not just "happen,"
as one might think if one were to
look only at the cases that have
been decided by the United States
Supreme Court as they appear in
constitutional law casebooks and
are discussed in academic commen-
tary. There are reasons why par-
ticular kinds of constitutional cases
are brought at particular times, and
more importantly, why particular
kinds of constitutional challenges are
asserted on the basis of particular
constitutional provisions rather than
on the basis of others.
I. Asserting Con-
stitutional Rights
For the litigating lawyer, the
"stuff of constitutional litigation" is
the Supreme Court's precedents
and the constitutional doctrine that
has been promulgated by the Su-
preme Court in prior cases. 5 In de-
ciding whether or not to assert a
constitutional challenge to a particu-
lar law or governmental action, and
in deciding on the basis of that chal-
lenge, the lawyer must look to the
precedents and doctrine. This ex-
amination of precedents and doc-
trine will determine the viability of a
particular constitutional challenge
and the basis on which that chal-
lenge should be made. Any limita-
tion on governmental power de-
signed to protect constitutional
rights must be found in the text or
internal inferences ofthe Constitu-
tion, and the lawyer must make a
decision as to which constitutional
provision or provisions the lawyer
will rely on in asserting the particu-
lar constitutional challenge.
I have illustrated this propo-
sition in the area of the constitutional
protection of personal autonomy by
tracing the development of the con-
stitutional right to parent and the
development of the constitutional
right of reproductive freedom. The
constitutional right to parent has
been referred to by the Supreme
Court as "perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recog-
nized by the Court.'" The constitu-
tional right to parent traces back to
two cases from the 1920's, Meyer
v. Nebraska.' where the Court in-
validated a state law prohibiting the
teaching of schoolchildren in any
language other than English, and
Pierce v, Society of Sisters."
where the Court invalidated a state
law prohibiting parents from send-
ing their children to private and pa-
rochial schools. Such laws seem-
ingly would violate the First
Amendment's guarantees offree-
dom of speech and association. But
at the time these cases were being
litigated, the First Amendment had
not yet been held to apply to the
states, so the lawyers challenging
these laws would have to find a dif-
ferent constitutional basis for their
challenge. They found this basis in
the Fourteenth Amendment's due
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process clause, which the Court
had been using for some years to
invalidate federal and state eco-
nomic regulation. Itwas not much
of a step for the Court to hold that
just as substantive due process pro-
tected economic freedom, it pro-
tected personal freedom as well,
here the right of parents to control
the upbringing and education of their
children." Thus was born the con-
stitutional right to parent, which
strongly limits the power of the
states to terminate or interfere with
parental rights," and in its most re-
cent application by the Court in
Troxel v. Granville," has put a
constitutional end to grandparent
visitation as we have known it. 12
The constitutional right of re-
productive freedom, reflected most
cogently today in the recognition of
a woman's constitutionally pro-
tected right to a safe and legal
abortion, 13 traces back in a line of
growth to the 1942 case of Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma." In that case,
the Court struck down on equal
protection grounds an Oklahoma
law providing for the compulsory
sterilization of persons who had
been convicted of three felonies in-
volving "moral turpitude," but ex-
empting most ''white collar" crimes.
Itmay be assumed that the Court
was strongly motivated to invalidate
this singularly aberrational law,
which was predicated on the sci-
entifically misplaced. belief that
criminal tendencies were inherited
and which was directed against
poor persons and racial minorities
who were more likely to commit
"common crimes." But the Court
needed to come up with a doctri-
nally acceptable way to do so. At
this time, the Court generally was
not disposed to sustain equal pro-
tection challenges and it was no
longer using substantive due pro-
cess to overturn governmental eco-
nomic regulation, so Justice Dou-
glas, writing for the Court in Skin-
ner, found it necessary to justify a
higher standard of scrutiny in this
case. He did so by saying that the
compulsory sterilization require-
ment implicated the fundamental
rights of marriage and procreation,
which he referred to as involving
"one of the basic civil rights of man"
and "fundamental to the very exist-
ence and survival of the race. "15 As
a result of Skinner, the right of pro-
creation, along with the right of
marriage, was recognized as a fun-
damental right, and while the Court
had not yet specifically articulated
a two-tier standard of review for
due process and equal protection
challenges, Skinner clearly stood
for the proposition that laws inter-
fering with marriage and procre-
ation were subject to a higher de-
gree of scrutiny than laws dealing
with economic and social regula-
tion."
Skinnerwas largely forgotten
until Griswold v. Connecticut"
came before the Court in 1965.
That case involved a challenge to a
nineteenth-century Connecticut law
that prohibited the use of contra-
ceptives by all persons, including
presumably by married persons.
Among the arguments asserted by
the lawyers challenging the law was
one based on Skinner, that the ban
on contraceptive use by married
persons interfered with their funda-
mental right to engage in intimate
marital relationships without risking
pregnancy - in essence that the right
to procreate also included the right
to avoid procreation. The Court
held the ban unconstitutional as vio-
lating the married couples' consti-
tutional "right of privacy." While the
Members of the Court sharply dis-
agreed on the constitutional basis
for the "right of privacy," they all
agreed that marriage and what we
would now call reproductive free-
dom were protected by the consti-
tutional "right of privacy," and they
all agreed that Connecticut's ban on
the use of contraceptives by mar-
ried persons violated the constitu-
tional "right of privacy?"
From the lawyers' perspective
the differing views on the Court as
to the constitutional basis for the
"right of privacy" following
Griswoldwas constitutionally irrel-
evant. Griswold had recognized a
constitutional "right of privacy," and
in the wake of Griswold, lawyers
could and did use this constitutional
"right of privacy" to challenge the
constitutionality of the anti-abortion
laws that existed in virtually all of
the states at this time. 19 Ifithadnot
been for the Court's explicit rec-
ognition of a constitutional "right of
privacy" in Griswold, a viable con-
stitutional basis for challenging the
anti-abortion laws would not have
existed at that time. The argument
for the lawyers challenging these
II. Michigan's Ban On
Second Parent Adoptions
MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE LAW JOURNAL *Winter/Spring 03 *Volume VII, Issue I Page 12
laws would, of course, be based on
Griswold. They would argue that
as regards the reproductive free-
dom of the pregnant woman, there
is no logical difference between us-
ing contraception to prevent an un-
wanted pregnancy from occurring
and having a medical abortion to
undo an unwanted pregnancy that
has occurred. They would further
argue that the state did not have a
compelling governmental interest in
preventing a woman from exercis-
ing her fundamental right to repro-
ductive freedom, so the anti-abor-
tion laws were unconstitutional.
The lawyers for the state
would respond to this argument
within the analytical framework of
the compelling governmental inter-
est standard of review. They would
argue that fundamental rights are not
absolute and that a ban on abor-
tion can be justified under this ex-
acting standard. They would argue
that there is a qualitative difference
between using contraception to
prevent an unwanted pregnancy
and terminating an unwanted preg-
nancy by an abortion, since an
abortion destroys potential human
life that has come into being and that
in the great majority of cases will
result in a live birth. Thus, they
would argue that the state's inter-
est in protecting human life from the
moment of conception is a compel-
ling governmental interest, and
since a prohibition on abortion is the
only effective way - and so the
"least drastic means" of advancing
that interest - a prohibition against
abortion can be sustained under the
exacting compelling governmental
standard ofreview,"
The argument for the lawyers
defending the anti-abortion laws is
a doctrinally valid argument and
could have been accepted by the
Court inRoe. The Court could have
distinguished Griswold on a con-
stitutionally principled basis, that is,
on a basis that was consistent with
the line of growth of existing con-
stitutional doctrine applicable to the
protection of reproductive freedom.
And, staying within the analytical
framework ofthe compelling gov-
ernmental interest standard of re-
view, the Court could have held that
the state's interest in protecting po-
tential human life from the moment
of conception was compelling and
that a ban on abortion was the "least
drastic means" of advancing that
interest. The Court, then, consistent
with existing constitutional doctrine,
could have upheld the constitution-
ality of the challenged anti-abortion
laws in Roe.
But constitutional doctrine can also
be extended in the line of growth.
In Roe, the Court held that a
woman's right of reproductive free-
dom, now protected by substantive
due process, included the right to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy
by a medical abortion, and that in
this context, the state's interest in
protecting potential human life was
not compelling until the stage of vi-
ability had been reached. I have
explained Roe as a case where the
Court engaged in constitutional
balancing, and making a value
judgment about the relative consti-
tutional importance of the woman's
interest in reproductive freedom
and the state's interest in protect-
ing potential human life, and it made
that value judgment in favor of the
woman's reproductive freedom in-
terest."
My point here is that lawyers want-
ing to challenge state anti-abortion
laws at the time of Roe were able
to do so because the Court's deci-
sion in Griswold explicitly recog-
nized a constitutional right of pri-
vacy and the Court's precedents in
Griswold and Skinner had held that
reproductive freedom was a funda-
mental right. As discussed above,
the constitutional challenge would
have failed if the Court had treated
abortion differently from contracep-
tion and had not made the value
judgment that in the context of anti-
abortion laws, a woman's repro-
ductive freedom interest was con-
stitutionally more important than the
state's interest in protecting poten-
tial human life. As it turned out, the
challenge was successful, and to-
day women have a constitutionally
protected right to have a safe and
legal abortion."
With this experience inmind,
we now tum to the perspective of
the lawyer seeking to prepare a
constitutional challenge to
Michigan's ban on second parent
adoptions by the current parent's
unmarried partner. The lawyer must
The status of illegitimacy
has expressed through
the ages society's con-
demnation of irrespon-
sible liaisons beyond the
bounds of marriage. But
visiting this condemna-
tion on the head of an
infant is illogical and un-
just. Moreover, impos-
ing disabilities on the
head of the illegitimate
child is contrary to the
basic concept of our sys-
tem that legal burdens
should bear some rela-
tionship to individual re-
sponsibility or wrongdo-
ing. Obviously, no child
is responsible for his
birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an
ineffectual- as well as an
unjust - way of deterring
the parent.
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develop a constitutional theory that
will serve as the basis of the chal-
lenge. This theory should be the one
that is most closely tied to existing
doctrine and precedent and so can
most readily be extended in the line
of growth to support the claim that
this ban on second parent adoption
is unconstitutional. Inso doing it is
necessary for the lawyer to identify
both the person whose constitu-
tional rights are being violated by
the ban and the constitutional pro-
vision that protects the rights of that
person with respect to the matter
in issue.
In my opinion the strongest
constitutional theory to support the
challenge to this ban, that is, the
theory that is most closely tied to
existing doctrine and precedent, is
that the ban violates the equal pro-
tection right of the child who is de-
prived of a second parent solely
because of the unmarried status of
the child's current parent and the
prospective adoptive parent. I
would refer to this child as the non-
marital child - the child who is de-
nied a second parent because ofthe
ban - and focus on the discrimina-
tion effected against this child by the
ban in comparison to who I would
refer to as the marital child - the child
whose prospective adoptive parent
is married to the child's current par-
ent.
The discrimination effected
against the non-marital child by the
ban is illustrated by the comparing
the situation of Sam and the situa-
tion of Samantha. Sam and
Samantha are both in the custody
of their divorced mothers, and we
will assume that their fathers are
dead or would not object to a sec-
ond parent adoption. Sam's mother
marries her opposite sex partner,
who then can and does adopt Sam.
Sam now has all the legal protec-
tions that come from having two
parents, such as the right to sup-
port, the right to intestate succes-
sion, the right to parental
decisionmaking by two parents,
and the right to be in the custody of
the second parent if Sam's mother
dies or becomes incapacitated.
Samantha's mother has a partner to
whom she is not married, either an
opposite sex partner, where they
choose not to marry, or a same-sex
partner, where they cannot marry.
Unlike Sam, Samantha cannot have
a second parent, with all the result-
ant legal protections, solely because
her mother will not or cannot marry
her partner. The constitutional claim
would be that the discrimination
against Samantha with respect to
the ability to have a second parent
solely because she is a non-marital
child, in comparison with Sam, who
is a marital child, deprives
Samantha of equal protection.
The doctrine and precedent
on which I would rely in support of
this theory is the long line of cases
beginning with Levy v. Louisi-
ana." holding violative of equal
protection virtually all legal discrimi-
nation against non-marital ("illegiti-
mate") children. As the Supreme
Court stated in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety CO.24:
In Levy and Weber,the Court
held unconstitutional the denial to
non-marital children of the right to
receive worker's compensation
benefits or wrongful death recov-
ery for the death of a parent. The
Court has also held it unconstitu-
tional for the state to deny welfare
benefits to a family that includes a
non-marital child," to deny a non-
marital child support from the iden-
tified natural father," and to deny a
non-marital child the right to inherit
from the father." The state must
also allow a child born out-of-wed-
lock a substantial period of time in
which to establish paternity against
the natural father, so that the child
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will be able to claim support from
him." This case, and the support
and inheritance cases, stand for the
proposition that the non-marital
child is entitled to the same rights
against the natural father that are
afforded to the marital child, and it
is completely irrelevant that the
natural father is not married to the
child's mother.
We now return to Samantha
and her equal protection claim. She
is a very sympathetic victim of
Michigan's second parent adoption
ban, both personally and constitu-
tionally in light of the Levy line of
cases. She is being denied a sec-
ond parent, not because of any
"fault" of her own, but because of
the conduct of her mother in not
marrying her partner or in choosing
a partner whom she cannot marry.
This makes Samantha's situation
very similar to that of the non-mari-
tal child in the Levy line of cases,
who suffered all the disabilities tra-
ditionally imposed on out-of-wed-
lock children because oftheir sta-
tus as "illegitimate." While the state
may disapprove of Samantha's
mother's "liaison" with a partner
whom she will not or cannot marry,
it is "illogical and unjust" to "visit
this condemnation" on Samantha by
denying her the legal benefits of
having a second parent. Penalizing
her in this way is an "ineffectual as
well as an unjust way of deterring
the parent." So even ifthe purpose
of the rule were to encourage mar-
riage - which is is not, since it ap-
plies to same sex partners, who
cannot legally marry - this would
not justify the discrimination effected
against Samantha by denying her
the legal protections that come from
having a second parent.
For these reasons, I think that
it is possible, both conceptually and
pragmatically, to bring Samantha
within the rationale of the Levy line
of cases and to maintain that a non-
marital child should have the same
right to have a second parent by
adoption as the marital child. Again,
like the non-marital children in the
Levy line of cases, Samantha is
being denied a very important legal
right because of societal disap-
proval of the conduct of her mother.
Thus, it is not very much of an ex-
tension of existing doctrine and pre-
cedent to argue that just as the equal
protection rights of the non-marital
children were violated in the Levy
line of cases when they were de-
nied benefits due to their disfavored
status as non-marital children, the
equal protection rights of Samantha
are also being violated when she is
denied the benefit of a second par-
ent because her current parent and
the prospective adoptive parent
likewise are not married.
A very important issue in
equal protection cases is the articu-
lated standard of review. Certain
kinds of classifications, such as
those involving race, gender or fun-
damental rights, are tested under a
standard of review requiring height-
ened scrutiny, but most classifica-
tions are tested under the less rig-
orous rational basis standard of re-
view. Classifications discriminating
against non-marital children are
now tested under the intermediate
level "important and substantial re-
lationship" standard of review: the
classification must be substantially
related to the advancement of an
important governmental interest."
It is arguable that this standard of
review should also be applied to
determine the constitutionality of
discrimination against children who
are denied the opportunity to have
a second parent by adoption be-
cause of the non-marital status of
their current parent and the pro-
spective adoptive parent. However,
the lawyer litigating the constitutional
challenge to Michigan's ban on sec-
ond parent adoption should pro-
ceed on the assumption that the less
rigorous rational basis standard will
be applicable and should be pre-
pared to demonstrate that the ban
is unconstitutional even under this
less rigorous standard. There is sub-
stantial precedential support for this
argument.
When applying the rational
basis standard of review, the Court
has been disposed to find uncon-
stitutional discriminations that are
based on societal prejudice against
unpopular groups or persons. Levy
and the other earlier cases invali-
dating discrimination against out-of-
wedlock children were decided
under an articulated or assumed
rational basis standard of review. In
fact, in those cases, the Court paid
little attention to the standard of re-
view, focusing instead on the unfair-
ness ofthe discrimination against
out-of-wedlock children who had
CONCLUSION
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no control ofthe circumstances of
their birth. Inother cases, applying
an articulated rational basis stan-
dard of review (sometimes after
rejecting claims for heightened scru-
tiny), the Court has invalidated a
city's denial of a permit for the op-
eration of a group home for the
mentally retarded," a state consti-
tutional provision prohibiting the
state and political subdivisions from
including discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation within the
ambit of any anti-discrimination
law," a federal law directed against
"hippie communes," that denied
food stamps to eligible persons liv-
ing in households containing more
than two unrelated individuals," and
a state law denying a free public
school education to undocumented
alien children." As the Court said
in the latter case: "We cannot ig-
nore the significant social costs
borne by our Nation when select
groups are denied the means to
absorb the values and skills upon
which our social order rests. [Thus]
the discrimination contained in [the
law] can hardly be considered ra-
tional unless it furthers some sub-
stantial goal of the State.'?'
It is difficult to see how the
discrimination against Samantha by
denying her the benefit of a second
parent "furthers some substantial
goal of the State," or for that mat-
ter, any legitimate state interest at
all. The state cannot rationally ar-
gue that it is "harmful" to children
to have an unmarried or gay or les-
bian adoptive parent, since the state
permits "free standing" adoption by
such persons. Nor can the state
argue that the purpose of the ban is
to encourage marriage between the
current parent and the prospective
adoptive parent, since it prohibits
second parent adoptions by gay and
lesbian partners, who cannot legally
marry the child's current parent. It
seems that the law providing for
second parent adoption has been
interpreted by most judges in
Michigan to bar adoption by the
unmarried partner of the child's cur-
rent parent either because of a fail-
ure of the judges to understand how
a second parent adoption operates
in these circumstances or because
of outright hostility toward allow-
ing unmarried and gay and lesbian
persons to adopt their partner's
child. Either way, it can be con-
tended that the ban is objectively
unreasonable and so violative of
equal protection even under the less
rigorous rational basis standard of
review.
III. Defining The Parties
Procedurally, I would
suggest bringing the case as a
plaintiff-defendant class action. The
plaintiffs would be children of
parents whose partners want to
adopt the children, but who are
prevented from doing so because
the partner is not married to the
children's current parent. They
would allege that their parent's
partner has not filed adoption
proceedings because the ban would
prevent any second parent adoption
from being granted." The class
would consist of all children who
are in this situation. The defendant
class would consist of all the
Michigan judges who have refused
to approve second parent
adoptions by the unmarried partner
of the current parent. The plaintiffs
would seek a declaratory judgment
to the effect that it violates the equal
protection rights ofthe children for
the state to deny them a second
parent by adoption because of the
non-marital status oftheir current
parent and the prospective adoptive
parent, and a mandatory injunction
directing all Michigan judges to
issue adoption orders in those
cases.
Constitutional rights come into
being because lawyers, looking to
constitutional doctrine and
precedent, succeed in persuading
courts that the right they are
asserting is supported by that
doctrine and precedent in the line
of growth. In this article, I have
explored establishing a constitutional
right, based on the equal protection
clause, for children to be adopted
by the unmarried partner of their
current parent.
IMCL 710.23a(4); MCL 710.51(5).
2 The term, "child's current parent"
refers to the parent having legal
custody of the child. Where the
spouse or partner of the child's
15 Id. at 541.
o
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current parent seeks to effect a
second parent adoption of the child,
it will be assumed that the child's
other parent is dead, has agreed to
the adoption, or would be subject to
termination of parental rights
pursuantto 710.51(6).
3 I have been advised by the Editors
of the Journal that the issue came
to the surface in the summer of2002
in the Washtenaw Family Court,
where the judges had been granting
second parent adoptions to the
unmarried partner of the custodial
parent for some seven years. The
Chief Judge of the Washtenaw
Family Court, after meeting with the
Chief Justice of the Michigan
Supreme Court, issued an order
directing that the judges of that Court
stop granting such adoptions. A
discussion of the authority of the
Chief Judge to issue that order and
of other questions relating to the
power of family court judges to grant
such adoptions based on their
differing interpretation of the statute
or of challenges to such adoptions
is beyond the scope of the present
article. For purposes of the present
article, it will be assumed that the
statute will continue to be
interpreted by most judges as
prohibiting such adoptions and/or
that the statute will be authoritatively
construed by the Michigan Supreme
Court as prohibiting such adoptions.
4 Robert A. Sedler, The
Constitution and Personal
Autonomy: The Lawyering
Perspective, 11 THOMAS M.
COOLEYL. REV. 771 (1994) (The
Fifth Annual Krinock Lecture, the
Thomas M. Cooley Law School,
November 23, 1993) (hereinafter
cited as Sedler, Personal
Autonomy).
5 Like all other areas of law,
constitutional law develops in a line
of growth. The Supreme Court's
decisions in prior cases serve as
precedents for the resolution of
future cases presenting the same or
similar issues. The doctrine that the
Court promulgates in these cases
and the rationale for its decisions are
applicable in future cases, where
that doctrine and rationale can be
extended or limited. The meaning of
a constitutional provision thus
develops incrementally over a
period oftime, and the line of growth
of that constitutional provision
strongly influences its application in
particular cases. See generally
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 MICH.L.REV.
1033, 1054 (1981); See also Robert
A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate
in Constitutional Adjudication:
An Assessment and a Different
Perspective, 44 OHIO STATE L.J.
93, 118-20 (1983).
6 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65; 120 S. Ct. 2054; 147 L. Ed. 2d
49(2000).
7262 U.S. 390; 43 S. Ct. 625; 67 L.
Ed. 1042 (1923).
8268 U.S. 510; 45 S. Ct. 571; 69 L.
Ed. 1070 (1925).
9 See the discussion of these cases
from the perspective of the lawyers
litigating them in Sedler, Personal
Autonomy, supra, note 4 at 776-779
10See the discussion Id. at 779.
II Supra note 6.
12 See Robert A. Sedler, A Parent s
Right to Choose: The
Constitutionality of Grandparent
Visitation According to Troxel v.
Granville, 81 MICH. B.J. 34
(2002).
13 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; 93 S.
Ct. 705; 35 L.Ed. 2d 147 (1973);
Planned Parenthood oj
Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833; 112 S. Ct.
2791; 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992).
14316 U.S. 535; 62 S. Ct. 1110; 86
L. Ed. 2d 1655 (1942).
16 See the discussion of Skinner in
Sedler, Personal Autonomy, supra
note 3 at 780-782.
17381 U.S. 479; 85 S. Ct. 1678; 14
L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965).
18In Roe v. Wade, the Court simply
said that the right of privacy was
part of the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause. 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973). In Eisenstadt v.Barid,405
U.S. 438 (1972), the Court clearly
separated the right of procreation
from the right of marriage, and held
that as a matter of equal protection,
unmarried person must have the
same right of access to
contraception as married persons,
because a ban on access to
contraception by unmarried persons
violated their right to reproductive
freedom. Griswold and Eisenstadt
are discussed in Sedler, Personal
Autonomy, supra, note 4 at 782-787.
19I was teaching at the University
of Kentucky from 1966 to 1977, and
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woman's ability to obtain an abortion,
and may refuse to provide funding
for abortions. See the discussion and
review of cases in Sedler, Personal
Autonomy, supra, note 4 at 789-791.
on behalf of the Kentucky affiliate
of the American Civil Liberties
Union I litigated the "Kentucky
version" of Roe v. Wade, Crossen
v. Attorney-General, 344 F.Supp.
587 (E.D.Ky.l972), vacated, 410
U.S. 950 (1973), as well as the
"Kentucky version" of the "round
two abortion litigation" reflected in
the Supreme Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52;
96 S. Ct. 2831; 49 L. Ed. 2d 788
(1976). Wolfe v. Schroering, 388
F.Supp. 631 (W.D.Ky.1964), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 523
(6th Cir.1976).
30 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,Inc., 473 U.S. 432; 105 S.
Ct. 3249; 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985).
31 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620;
116 S. Ct. 1620; 134 L. Ed. 2d 855
(1996).
23 391 U.S. 68; 88 S. Ct. 1509; 20
L.Ed. 2d 436 (1968). 32 United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528; 93 S. Ct. 2821; 37 L. Ed. 2d
782 (1973).
24406 U.S. 164, 175;92S.Ct.1400;
31 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1972).
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